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Dornbusch’s exchange rate overshooting hypothesis is a central building block in 
international macroeconomics. Yet, empirical studies of monetary policy have 
typically found exchange rate effects that are inconsistent with overshooting. This 
puzzling result has developed into a “styled facts” to be reckoned with in policy 
modelling. However, many of these studies, in particular those using VARs, have 
disregarded the strong contemporaneous interaction between monetary policy and 
exchange rate movements by placing zero restriction on them. By instead imposing a 
long-run neutrality restriction on the real exchange, thereby allowing the interest rate 
and the exchange rate to react simultaneously to any news, I find that the puzzles 
disappear. In particular, a contractionary monetary policy shock has a strong effect on 
the exchange rate that appreciates on impact. The maximum effect occurs 
immediately, and the exchange rate thereafter gradually depreciates to baseline, 
consistent with the Dornbusch overshooting hypothesis and with few exceptions 
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 1  Introduction 
Dornbusch’s (1976) well known exchange rate overshooting hypothesis is a central building 
block in international macroeconomics; stating that an interest rate increase leads to an 
immediate appreciation in the nominal exchange rate, in line with uncovered interest parity 
(UIP). Its influence is evident in the rapidly growing “New Open Economy Macroeconomics” 
(NOEM) literature, (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, 2000, for seminal contributions and 
Lane, 2001, for survey), as well as in practical policy discussions spanning far outside the 
academic sphere (Rogoff, 2002). With what seems like an ever-increasing number of 
publications citing Dornbusch (1976), the paper has been described as one the most important 
papers in international economics over the entire twentieth century (Rogoff, 2002). 
When confronted with data, however, few empirical studies analysing the effects of 
monetary policy have found support for Dornbusch overshooting. Instead, they have found 
that following a contractionary monetary policy shock, the real exchange rate either 
depreciates, or, if it appreciates, it does so only gradually and for a prolonged period of up to 
three years, thereby giving a hump-shaped response that violates UIP. In the literature, the 
first phenomenon has been termed the exchange rate puzzle, whereas the second has been 
referred to as delayed overshooting or  forward discount puzzle, see Cushman and Zha 
(1997).
1  
The dominant approach for establishing the quantitative effects of monetary policy 
shocks has been the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach initiated by Sims (1980).
2 Most of 
the recent VAR studies of the open economy, including Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and 
Kim and Roubini (2000) for the G7 countries, Peersman and Smets (2003) and Favero and 
Marcellino (2004) for the aggregate Euro area, Mojon and Peersman (2003) for individual 
Euro area countries and Lindé (2003) for Sweden have found evidence of at least one of these 
puzzles. On the other hand, evidence of these puzzles has been so persuasive that the puzzles 
themselves are now about to be considered consensus, as is evident from the following quote 
in Adolfson et al. (2005, p. 37):  
“Although the nominal frictions in the model provides some persistence in the real 
exchange rate following a policy shock, it is evident that the model does not provide us with 
a hump-shaped response of the real exchange rate which is a persuasive feature of 
estimated VARs” (author’s emphasis). 
The quoted paper is one of an increasing number that try to match impulse responses 
of a theoretical “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium” (DSGE) model with those from an 
empirical VAR that exhibits a pronounced delay overshooting puzzle in the real exchange 
rate. The seminal paper by Smets and Wouters (2002) for the Euro area is a prominent 
example. Murchison et al. (2004) for Canada and Lindé et al (2004) for Sweden are other 
examples, of which the last paper goes a long way in suggesting ways to incorporate the 
exchange rate puzzle into the theoretical model. 
                                                 
1 The finding that UIP does not hold is not new; see Fama (1984) for a contribution to the international finance 
literature and Engel (1996) for survey. However, the VAR literature focuses on whether UIP holds conditionally 
with respect to monetary policy. 
2 For the role of VAR models in central bank’s policy analysis, see for instance Greenspan (2005). 
  2In this paper I argue that puzzling results are due to inadequate treatment of the 
simultaneity problem between monetary policy and the exchange rate. In particular, most 
VAR studies of open economies (including those referred to above), deal with this 
simultaneity problem by either (i) placing zero restriction on the contemporaneous response 
of the systematic interest rate setting to an exchange rate shock or by (ii) restricting the 
exchange rate from reacting immediately to a monetary policy shock. Both of these 
restrictions are inconsistent with established theory and also in contrast to how practitioners 
view the relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate. In particular, in an open 
economy, the exchange rate is an important transmission channel for foreign shocks that the 
central bank may respond to within the month or quarter which is the usual sampling 
frequency in these studies. The exchange rate, being an asset price determined in foreign 
markets, will also react instantaneously to monetary policy surprises. Hence, the structural 
shocks cannot be recovered using either of these recursive restrictions on the parameters.  
To solve the simultaneity problem, this paper suggests instead an alternative 
identification that restricts the long run multipliers of the shocks, but leaves the 
contemporaneous relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate intact. 
Identification is achieved by assuming that monetary policy shocks can have no long run 
effect on the level of the real exchange rate. In the short run, however, monetary policy is free 
to influence the exchange rate. Eventually though, the effect dies out and the real exchange 
rate returns to its initial level. This is a standard neutrality assumption that holds for a large 
class of models in the monetary policy literature (see Obstfeld, 1985; Clarida and Gali, 1994).  
Once allowing for a contemporaneous relationship between the interest rate and the 
exchange rate, the remaining VAR can be identified using standard recursive zero restrictions 
on the impact matrix of shocks; assuming a lagged response in domestic variables (such as 
output and inflation) to monetary policy shocks. These restrictions are less controversial and 
studies identifying monetary policy without these restrictions have found qualitatively similar 
results, see for example Faust et al. (2004) and the references therein. More importantly 
however, the assumption of a delayed response in output and inflation combined with a long 
run neutrality restriction on the real exchange rate following a monetary policy surprise, are 
core assumptions underlying the Dornbusch’s overshooting model; consistent with NOEM 
implications (Lane, 2001) and are empirically realistic (Rogoff, 2002). 
The results using this alternative identification strategy are striking. Contrary to the 
recent consensus, a contractionary monetary policy shock has a strong effect on the exchange 
rate which appreciates on impact. The maximal impact occurs immediately, and the exchange 
rate thereafter gradually depreciates back to baseline; consistent with the Dornbusch 
overshooting hypothesis and with few exceptions consistent with UIP. Hence, I find no 
evidence of any exchange rate puzzle.  
This paper is not the first one that attempts to find another approach to the 
simultaneity problem than imposing a zero contemporaneous restriction in the VAR. In a 
recent paper, Faust and Rogers (2003) relax the recursive contemporaneous restrictions and 
impose sign restrictions (using only weak implications from theory) to identify monetary 
policy shocks. By dropping one after one of what they call dubious restrictions, they can test 
  3whether the key results are robust to alternative identification. By doing so, they find that the 
delayed overshooting result is sensitive to the assumptions. Their results allow for an early 
peak in the exchange rate, which might give a role for the conventional overshooting model. 
However, the effect is not precisely identified, so no robust conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to the exact timing of the peak response of the exchange rate. Furthermore, they also 
find that monetary policy shocks lead to large UIP deviations. Similar results are also found in 
Scholl and Uhlig (2005), using a related procedure to that of Faust and Rogers (2003), 
although they find in addition that the exchange rate actually depreciates on impact following 
a contractionary monetary policy shock  
There are two major problems related to this alternative identification strategy. First, 
although the approach effectively illustrates the sensitivity of results to recursive restrictions, 
applying sign restrictions is not sufficient for identifying monetary policy shocks. To be able 
to calculate the exact responses in the other variables to these shocks, additional identifying 
restrictions are required. Second, by dropping the recursive restrictions, the authors may no 
longer be able to identify the same monetary policy shocks that have previously been studied 
in the literature (a point the authors themselves acknowledge).
3
An alternative (non-VAR) approach to studying the impact of monetary policy shocks 
on the exchange rate is through event studies. These measure the immediate response of the 
exchange rate to shocks associated with particular policy actions in real time, thereby 
avoiding the issue of identification altogether. In sharp contrast to the majority of VAR 
studies, the event studies find that a surprise monetary policy shock has a substantial effect on 
the exchange rate. For instance, Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2005) find that 
a surprise monetary policy shock that increases the interest rate has a significant appreciating 
effect on the exchange rate. This link between surprise monetary policy actions and initial 
exchange rate responses is therefore a feature that properly identified VAR models should be 
able to replicate. A study like Scholl and Uhlig (2005) which finds that the exchange rate 
instead depreciates following a contractionary monetary policy shock seems then less 
plausible.  
  Event studies, with their exclusive focus on the immediate response, cannot answer 
questions about overshooting. To do so, one needs to identify monetary policy shocks in a 
system like the structural VARs as is done in the present study. However, I find it comforting 
that the present results are consistent with the major finding of the event studies.  
The analysis is applied to a set of small open economies; Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Sweden and UK, which although diverse, have all had a fairly long period of 
floating exchange rates.
4 In addition, all of them have recently adopted an inflation targeting 
framework for monetary policy. Small open countries are chosen to illustrate the point, as the 
exchange rate is expected to be both an important transmission channel for shocks and a 
                                                 
3 For instance, Scholl and Uhlig (2005) identify contractionary monetary policy shocks by restricting among others 
domestic prices from rising, thereby avoiding “price puzzles” by construction. Although a reasonable assumption, 
they find puzzling responses in the other variables, as real output rises and the real exchange rate initially 
depreciates, which seems inconsistent with what they have assumed for prices. Hence, one might question whether 
their identified monetary policy shock may be a hybrid of shocks, lacking clear economic interpretation.  
4 See also Bjørnland (2005) for a detailed analysis of Norway that finds corroborate results. 
  4variable the central bank may want to react to (Taylor, 2001). Further, focusing on small 
countries simplifies the identification, as one can assume that domestic shocks will have no 
effect on the foreign interest rates, as is also assumed in Dornbusch’s model.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the VAR methodology used to 
identify monetary policy shocks and section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 
provides robustness checks and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  The identified VAR model 
The variables in the VAR model are chosen to reflect the theoretical set up of a New-
Keynesian small open economy model, such as that described in Clarida et al. (2001) and 
Svensson (2000). In particular, the VAR model comprises log of real GDP (yt), log of the 
quarterly changes in the consumer price index (CPI) (πt) – referred to hereafter as inflation, 
the three month domestic interest rate (it), the trade-weighted foreign interest rate (it*) and the 
log of the real trade-weighted exchange rate (et) (see appendix A for details). 
  This paper builds on the traditional closed economy VAR literature (Sims, 1980; 
Christiano et al., 1999, 2005, among many others), in that a standard recursive structure is 
identified between macroeconomic variables and monetary policy, so that macroeconomic 
variables such as output and inflation do not react contemporaneously to monetary shocks, 
whereas there might be a simultaneous feedback from the macro environment to monetary 
variables. That monetary policy affects domestic variables with a lag, is consistent with the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy emphasised in the theoretical set up in Svensson 
(1997). Further, Bagliano and Favero (1998) show that when monetary policy shocks are 
identified in this recursive way on a single monetary policy regime, the responses of the 
shocks suggest a pattern for the monetary transmission mechanism that is consistent with the 
impulse responses of monetary policy shocks identified instead using financial market 
information from outside the VAR, as in Rudebusch (1998).  
  Where the present approach differs from the traditional method, is in that monetary 
policy shocks are restricted from having long-run effects on real exchange rates. As already 
emphasised, this is a standard neutrality assumption that holds for a large class of models in 
the monetary policy literature.
5 In particular, Clarida and Gali (1994) show that this kind of 
restriction on the real exchange rate is consistent with a stochastic version of the two country, 
rational expectations open-macro model developed by Obstfeld (1985). The model exhibits 
the standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch results in the short run when prices reacts 
sluggishly, but in the long run, prices adjust fully to all shocks. 
Theory has provided several reasons why one should avoid using a Cholesky 
decomposition that either i) restricts the (systematic) monetary policy from reacting 
contemporaneously to an exchange rate shock, or ii) restricts the exchange rate from reacting 
immediately to a monetary policy shock. The first restriction (initially adopted by 
Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995), is equivalent to assuming that the monetary authority ignores 
                                                 
5 Bjørnland and Leitemo (2004) explore, in a similar vein, the use of short and long run restrictions in order to 
identify the interdependence of stock prices and monetary policy in a structural VAR of a closed economy. 
  5any surprise movement in exchange rates that have occurred during the time in which 
decisions on the policy variables are made, which is highly unlikely. Not only is the exchange 
rate an important transmission channel for foreign exchange shocks. By being an asset price, 
the exchange rate is inherently a forward-looking and expectations-determined variable that 
will reflect expected future return on the asset. This may by itself provide important 
information about the expected development of the determinants of the targeting variables 
that the central bank may want to react to, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Taylor (2001) 
for arguments, and Clarida et al. (1998) for empirical evidence.  
  The second set of restrictions commonly used, namely that the exchange rate can not 
react immediately to a monetary policy shock (i.e. Favero and Marcellino, 2004; Mojon and 
Peersman, 2003, among others), imposes a puzzle on the system by definition. The 
assumption seems also implausible, in particular in the post Bretton Woods era of managed 
float, where exchange rates have shown a volatile behaviour.  
  It is fair to say that several of the authors using traditional VARs have been 
concerned about the validity of these restrictions and have investigated their implications by 
rearranging the direction of causation between the interest rate and the exchange rate to see if 
that makes a difference.
6 However, this strategy seems unlikely to produce the correct impulse 
responses if there is a genuine simultaneous relationship between the two variables. Most 
likely it will lead to the effects of the shocks being underestimated, as a recursive ordering 
will always either a) disregard the simultaneous reaction of the monetary policy stance to the 
exchange rate shocks, or b) exclude the simultaneous reaction of the exchange rate to the 
monetary policy shocks. This will effectively be demonstrated below when the pitfalls of the 
standard recursive Cholesky restrictions are illustrated. 
 
2.1 Identification  
Throughout this paper, I follow what has now become standard practice in VAR analysis (see 
for example Christiano et al., 1999) and identify monetary policy shocks with the shock in an 
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where it is the instrument used by the monetary authority (usually the interest rate) and f is a 
linear function that relates the instrument to the information set (feedback rule). The monetary 
policy shock 
t
MP ε  is normalised to have unit variance, and σ is the standard deviation of the 
monetary policy shock. 
t
MP ε  is assumed to be orthogonal to the elements in the information 
set (…). Having identified the feedback rule (from the variables that are in the information 
set) the VAR approach concentrates on deviations from this rule. Hence, such deviations 
provide researchers with an opportunity to detect the responses of macroeconomic variables 
                                                 
6 Peersman and Smets (2003) tested robustness of their Cholesky identification by allowing for some degree of 
simultaneous response. However, in none of the tests did they allow the domestic interest rate to react 
contemporaneously to all shocks, which is an equally implausible assumption.  
  6to monetary policy shocks that are not expected by the market. Obviously, I then assume that 
the market also knows the rule. 
Define  Zt as the (5x1) vector of the macroeconomic variables discussed above, 
'
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t
, where all variables but the real exchange rate are assumed to be 
(trend-) stationary
7.  Zt  can be written in terms of its moving average (ignoring any 
deterministic terms) 
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where  vt is a (5x1) vector of reduced form residuals assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed, vt ~ iid(0,Ω), with positive definite covariance matrix Ω. B(L) is the 
(5x5) convergent matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, 
0 ()
j
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∞
= = L ∑ . Following the 
literature, the underlying orthogonal structural disturbances (εt) are assumed to be written as 
linear combinations of the innovations (vt), i.e.,  
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The VAR can then be written in terms of the structural shocks as 
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where  . Clearly, if S is identified, one can derive the MA representation in (4) 
since B(L) can be calculated from a reduced form estimation. Hence, to go from the reduced 
form VAR to the structural interpretation, one needs to apply restrictions on the S matrix. 
Only then can one recover the relevant structural parameters from the covariance matrix of 
the reduced form residuals.  
() () BLS CL =
To identify S, the εt‘s are assumed to be normalised so they all have unit variance. 
The normalisation of cov(εt) implies that SS’ = Ω. With a five variable system, this imposes 
15 restrictions on the elements in S. However, as the S matrix contains 25 elements, to 
orthogonalise the different innovations, ten more restrictions are needed.  
With a five variables VAR, one can identify five structural shocks. The first two are 
of primary interest and are interpreted as monetary policy shocks (εt
MP) and real exchange rate 
shocks (εt
ER). I follow standard practice in the VAR literature and only loosely identify the 
last three shocks as inflation shocks (interpreted as cost push shocks) (εt
CP), output shocks 
(εt
Y) and foreign interest rate shocks (εt
i*). Ordering the vector of structural shocks as 
 and following the standard economy literature in identifying 
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7 This assumption is further discussed in the empirical analysis below. 
  7monetary policy shocks, the recursive order between monetary policy shocks and the 
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The recursive Cholesky restriction used in the closed economy literature, namely to assume 
that domestic variables such as output and inflation do not simultaneously react to the policy 
variables, while the simultaneous reaction from the economic environment to policy variables 
is allowed for, is taken care of by placing the domestic variables above the interest rate in the 
ordering, and assuming zero restrictions on the relevant coefficients in the S matrix as shown 
in (5). By examining the relevant columns in S, one can interpret the two shocks somewhat 
further. In particular, while price shocks can affect all variables but output 
contemporaneously, output shocks can affect both output and prices contemporaneously. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to interpret a price shock as a cost push shock (moving prices 
before output), whereas output shocks will be dominated by both demand shocks and supply 
shocks. Furthermore, the foreign interest rate is placed on the top of the ordering, assuming it 
will only be affected by exogenous foreign monetary policy contemporaneously; a plausible 
small country assumption.
8 This provides nine contemporaneous restrictions directly on the S 
matrix. 
However, the matrix is still one restriction short of identification. The standard 
practice in the VAR literature, namely to place the exchange rate last in the ordering and 
assuming S45 = 0, so that monetary variables are restricted from reacting simultaneously to the 
exchange rate shock, while the exchange rate is allowed to react simultaneously to all 
variables, would have provided enough restriction to identify the system, thereby allowing for 
the use of the standard Cholesky recursive decomposition.  
However, if that restriction is not valid but is nonetheless imposed, the estimated 
responses to the structural shocks will be severely biased. Instead, the restriction that a 
monetary policy shock can have no long-run effects on the real exchange rate is imposed, 
which as discussed above, is a plausible neutrality assumption. This can be found by setting 
the values of the infinite number of relevant lag coefficients in (4), 
54, 0 j j C
∞
= ∑ , equal to zero. 
By using this long-run restriction, there are enough restriction to identify and orthogonalise all 
shocks. Writing the long-run expression of  () () BLS CL =  as  
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8 I have also experienced with alternating the order of the first three variables in Z, without much effects on results.  
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C(L) respectively, the long-run restriction that C54(1) = 0 implies  
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3  Empirical results 
The model is estimated for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and UK. Quarterly data 
from 1983Q1 to 2004Q4 are used, except for New Zealand. Using an earlier starting period 
than 1983 will make it hard to identify a stable monetary policy regime, as monetary policy 
prior to 1983 has experienced important structural changes and unusual operating procedures 
that would imply severe parameter instability (see for instance Bagliano and Favero, 1998; 
Clarida et al., 2000). For New Zealand, the start date is set to 1988 as the period 1983-1987 is 
characterised with a high degree of volatility when New Zealand changed from a closed and 
centrally controlled economy to one of the most open countries in the OECD (see Evans et al., 
1996). Below, robustness checks are nevertheless performed for all countries by extending the 
sample backwards and forwards in time. There are no qualitative changes to the impact of the 
shocks.  
  Consistent with most other related studies, the variables, with the exception of the 
real exchange rate, are specified in levels.
9 This implies that any potential cointegrating 
relationship between the variables will be implicitly determined in the model (see Hamilton, 
1994).
10 Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) also argue for using VAR in levels as a modelling 
strategy, as one avoids the danger of inconsistency in the parameters caused by imposing 
incorrect cointegrating restrictions; though at the cost of reducing efficiency. One may argue 
(Giordani, 2004) that following the theoretical model set up in Svensson (1997) as a data 
generating process, rather than including output in levels, one should either include the output 
gap in the VAR, or the output gap along with the trend level of output. However, as pointed 
out by Lindé (2003), a practical point that Giordani does not address is how to compute trend 
output (thereby also the output gap). I therefore instead follow Lindé (2003) and include a 
linear trend in the VAR along with output in levels. In that way I try to address this problem 
by modelling the trend implicit in the VAR. Also, the use of a trend in the VAR serves as a 
good approximation for ensuring that the VAR is invertible if the variables are non-stationary, 
in particular given the short span of data used. 
The real exchange rate is clearly non-stationary and is differenced to obtain 
stationarity. By applying long-run restrictions to the first-differenced real exchange rate, the 
 
9 Based one the standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test, I can not reject that any of the variables 
except possibly inflation are integrated of first order. However, due to the low power of the ADF tests to 
differentiate between a unit root and a (trend-) stationary process, I can not rule out that most of the variables could 
equally well be represented in levels, but with a trend.  
10 There is little evidence of any cointegration relationship at the outset, with the hypothesis of one cointegration 
vector being at most accepted.  
  9effects of monetary policy shocks on the level of the exchange rate will eventually sum to 
zero (c.f. Blanchard and Quah 1989).
11  
The lag order of the VAR-model is determined using the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn 
information criteria and the F-forms of likelihood ratio tests for model reductions. Most tests 
suggested that three lags were acceptable for all countries, although some indicate four lags. 
With a relatively short sample, I therefore decided to use three lags in the estimation and 
check for robustness using alternative lag lengths. With three lags, the hypothesis of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticty is rejected for all countries, although some non-
normality remained in the system. In a few cases impulse dummies (that take the value 1 in 
one quarter and 0 otherwise) were included, to take account of extreme outliers. That is, for 
Sweden, three dummies were included; 1992Q3, 1993Q1 and 1995Q4, where the first 
captures an exceptionally high interest rate increase (almost 500 percent) implemented by the 
Riksbank in order to defend the Swedish exchange rate (see also the discussion in Lindé 
2003), the second reflects the subsequent floating of the Swedish krona and the final one 
captures additional turbulence in the exchange rate. For Australia two dummies were 
included; 1984Q1 and 2000Q3, that reflected a substantial decrease and increase in the 
inflation rate respectively. With these dummies incorporated, some non-normality 
nevertheless remained, although mainly in the foreign interest rate equation. However, the 




3.1 Cholesky decomposition 
For comparison, I start by discussing the results using a standard Cholesky ordering, before 
turning to the preferred structural decomposition in section 3.2 below. The purpose of this 
exercise is to show that by using similar identification schemes to what has been standard 
practice in the literature, one will get the same pattern of delayed overshooting that has been 
found in Kim and Roubini (2000) and Murchison et al. (2004) for Canada, Lindé (2003) and 
Lindé et al. (2004) for Sweden and Evans and Eichenbaum (1995) for the UK among others.
13
If there is strong simultaneity between monetary policy and the exchange rate, one would not 
expect that a Cholesky decomposition of the effects on shocks would pick up this 
simultaneity, since one of the shocks is assumed to have no immediate effect on one of the 
variables. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below, which shows the impulse responses for the 
interest rate and the exchange rate from a monetary policy shock, using two different 
Cholesky orderings. The solid line corresponds to the baseline Cholesky assumption that an 
exchange rate shock has no immediate effect on the interest rate, whereas the dotted line 
corresponds to an ordering where monetary policy shock has no immediate effect on the 
                                                 
11 Testing for unit roots in the real exchange rate yields the following ADF t-statistics for Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Sweden and the UK respectively: tADF = -1.806, tADF = -0.5625, tADF = -2.381, tADF = -2.631, tADF = -2.543 
(using two lags in the estimation). Using alternative lag lengths or extending the sample backwards to 1973/78 
does not change the results. 
12 Diagnostic tests can be obtained from the author on request. 
13 To modify this statement somewhat, Kim and Roubini (2000) do allow for a simultaneous response between the 
interest rate and the exchange rate, but restrict instead the domestic interest rate from reacting contemporaneously 
to a foreign interest rate shock. I find these restrictions equally implausible as the standard ones, and as it turns out, 
delayed overshooting in still present in a few of the countries they study (e.g. Canada and Germany).  
  10Figure 1.  Response to a monetary policy shock, using two different Cholesky orderings
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1) The solid line corresponds to the Cholesky decomposition where the interest rate is ordered before the exchange 
rate in the VAR. In the alternative ordering (exc-i), the interest rate and the exchange rate swap places. Note that 
an increase in the exchange rate implies depreciation. 
  11real exchange rate. In the figures below, the effect of the monetary policy shock is normalised 
so that the interest rate increases by one percentage point the first quarter. Note that an 
increase/decrease in the real exchange rate implies depreciation/appreciation.
14
  The figure illustrates that a contractionary monetary policy shock that increases the 
interest rate temporarily, has a puzzling effect on the exchange rate. Using the baseline 
Cholesky ordering (solid line) there is evidence of an exchange rate puzzle and/or delayed 
overshooting for all countries. Most pronounced is the puzzle in Australia, where a monetary 
policy shock implies a continuous depreciation of the exchange rate of more than a year, 
before, contrary to common beliefs, it appreciates back to equilibrium. Similar results are also 
found for New Zealand, although the initial response is negative. For Canada and Sweden 
there is clear evidence of delayed overshooting (as well as an initial exchange rate puzzle in 
Canada), as the exchange rate appreciates for 1-2 years before it depreciates back to 
equilibrium. UK also displays puzzling results, with (a very small) initial depreciation, 
followed by a delayed appreciation, and then a substantial deprecation.  
  Using the alternative Cholesky ordering (dotted line), the initial effect of a monetary 
policy shock on the exchange rate is forced to zero, thereby generating a “puzzle” by 
assumption. For all countries except Australia and Canada the different orderings does not 
imply a lot of difference, since the initial effect identified with the baseline Cholesky ordering 
is close to zero nevertheless. For Australia and Canada, there is however clear difference 
between the two orderings initially, thereafter the alternative follows the baseline scenario.
15  
 
3.2 Structural identification scheme 
I now turn to the preferred structural model that was outlined in Section 2 above. Figure 2-6 
graph the impulse responses of a monetary policy shock on the interest rate, exchange rate, 
GDP and inflation for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and UK respectively. The 
effect is again normalised so the response of the interest rate is 1 pp. the first quarter. The 
upper and lower dashed lines plotted in each graph are the one-standard-error bands.
16
  The figures (frame A) illustrates, as above, that a monetary policy shock increases 
interest rates temporarily. There is a degree of interest-rate inertia in the model, as a monetary 
policy shock is only offset by a gradual lowering of the interest rate. The nominal interest rate 
returns to its steady-state value just after 1-2 years and then goes below its steady-state value. 
Both the interest-rate inertia and the “reversal” of the interest rate stance are consistent with 
what has become considered to be good monetary policy conduct, see Woodford (2003). 
Whereas the effect of a monetary policy shock on the interest rate (frame A) is 
consistent with what was found above using the Cholesky decomposition, the effect on the 
exchange rate (frame B) has now completely changed. Contrary to the results found above 
and in most other open economy studies, there is no evidence of any exchange rate puzzle in  
                                                 
14 For the Cholesky decomposition, all variables in the VAR are specified in levels, but with a trend. Specifications 
using no trend were also carried out; albeit with no overall change in the results.  
15 Standard deviation bands (can be obtained from the author on request) indicate that only for Australia and 
Canada are the initial responses significantly different using the two orderings. 
16 They were generated from 2500 draws by Monte Carlo integrations following Sims and Zha (1999). This is a 
Bayesian method based on the natural conjugate prior. The draws are made directly from the posterior distribution 
of the VAR coefficients, as suggested in Doan (2004). 
  12Figure 2. Australia: Response to a monetary policy shock, using the structural VAR 
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Figure 3. Canada: Response to a monetary policy shock, using the structural VAR 
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  13Figure 4. New Zealand: Response to a monetary policy shock, using the structural VAR 
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Figure 5. Sweden: Response to a monetary policy shock, using the structural VAR 
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  14Figure 6. UK: Response to a monetary policy shock, using the structural VAR 
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any of the countries. The monetary policy shock has a strong and immediate impact on the 
exchange rate, which now appreciates by 1-3 percent on impact. The maximal impact of the 
policy shock occurs contemporaneously, with the notable exception of UK and to a lesser 
extent Canada, where the maximal impact is delayed one quarter. However, the adjustment 
following the initial response is small compared to the impact effect, at least in Canada. 
Following the initial response, the exchange rate thereafter gradually depreciates back to 
baseline consistent the Dornbusch overshooting hypothesis. The path of adjustment will 
depend on the extent of nominal rigidities in the economy, since these influence the speed 
with which the economy adjusts in response to shocks.  
Do the reported results appear reasonable? The initial effect seems consistent with 
what has been found in a series of event studies that measure the immediate response of the 
exchange rate to shocks associated with particular policy actions. For instance, Zettelmeyer 
(2004), analysing Australia, Canada and New Zealand using daily data, finds that a 1 pp 
contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. Kearns and 
Manners (2005) using intraday data for the same three countries plus the UK find similar 
results, although the magnitude of the effect of the shocks is somewhat smaller.  
  Finally, consistent with the strong impact on the exchange rate, output falls gradually 
and reaches a minimum after approximately 1.5-2 years. The effect thereafter quickly dies 
out. The effect on inflation is on the other hand small. With the exception of Canada and 
possibly Sweden (where the initial effect is not significantly different from zero), there is 
some evidence of an initial price puzzle (where inflation rises following a contractionary 
  15monetary policy shock) which is commonly found in the literature. This initial increase has 
recently been explained (Ravenna and Walsh, 2003; Chowdhury et al., 2003) by a cost 
channel of the interest rate (i.e., the increased interest rate increases borrowing costs for firms 
and therefore prices) and is less of a puzzle.
17 The effect on inflation is thereafter significantly 
negative as expected, and peaks after 2-3 years. Overall, the small and sluggish effect on 
inflation is a persistent feature in many other studies of open economies, but also in 
conventional closed economy studies like Christiano et al. (1999, 2005).  
Having asserted that the exchange rate behaviour is consistent with Dornbusch 
overshooting, I next turn to examine whether the subsequent response in the exchange rate is 
consistent with UIP. If UIP holds following a contractionary monetary policy shock, then the 
fall in the interest rate differential   will be offset by an expected depreciation of the 
exchange rate between time t and t+1. To explore this issue in more detail, I follow 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and define Ψ
* (-) tt ii
t as the ex post difference in return between 
holding one period foreign or domestic bonds. Measured in domestic currency, excess return 
is then given by: 
 
*
1 -4 * (- tt t t t ii s s ) ψ + =+ ,         ( 8 )  
 
where st is the nominal exchange rate and st+1 is the forecasted three-month ahead exchange 
rate response.
18 One implication of UIP is that the conditional expectations of the excess 
return should be zero: 
 
0 tt j Eψ + =           ( 9 )  
 
for all j ≥ 0, where Et denotes conditional expectations. Figure 7 reports the point estimates 
(and both one and two standard errors) of the dynamic response function of (9) on the basis of 
the estimated VARs. Note that as it is the real exchange rate that is included in the VAR, I 
have to adjust for the effect of monetary policy shocks on prices to obtain the effect on the 
nominal exchange rate;  .
*
t tt sepp =− + t
                                                
19  
The figure shows that, with the exception of Canada and the UK, the responses 
essentially fluctuate around zero, consistent with UIP. For Canada and the UK, there are 
significant negative deviations from zero initially (as the exchange rate reacts with a delay of 
one quarter compared to the other countries), but thereafter these responses also essentially 
 
17 Eichenbaum (1992) argued that a price puzzle will appear when one (wrongly) omit a commodity price variable 
from the VAR that represents inflation pressure to which the central bank reacts (see also Sims 1992 and Leeper et 
al. 1996). However, recently Hanson (2004) has noted that the inclusion of the commodity index is less successful 
in alleviating the price puzzle in VAR models estimated with data for the past twenty years, thus leading me to 
leave out the variable altogether. 
18 The exchange rate is multiplied by four to be annualized, as the interest rate is measured in annual terms.  
19 To be precise, I can only correct for domestic inflation impulses as foreign prices are not among the endogenous 
variables in the VAR. This restriction is equivalent to assuming that domestic monetary policy have negligible 
effect on foreign prices, which is a common small open economy assumption used among other in Dornbusch 
(1976). The excess return calculated will therefore only be correct up to the point that this assumption is warranted. 
  16fluctuate around zero. Hence, I find basic confirmation of UIP, which contrasts with the 
results presented in the vast VAR literature including Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) using 




Figure 7 Excess returns 


















123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0  































123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0  
 
Finally, I turn to quantify the contribution of monetary policy shocks in explaining overall 
exchange rate fluctuations. This is summarized in the first row in Table 1, which shows the 
variance decomposition of the real exchange rate with respect to the monetary policy shocks 
for all five countries. In the second row in Table 1 the reverse question is asked, namely, what 
is the contribution of exchange rate shocks in accounting for the variation in interest rates? 
From the impulse responses (not reported), an exchange rate shock that depreciates the 
exchange rate leads to a temporary increase in the interest rates. This behaviour is consistent 
with the central banks reacting to the exchange rate to the extent that it affects output and 
inflation.
21 Given these responses, the variance decomposition may therefore provide us with 
                                                 
20 Notable exceptions are Cushman and Zha (1997) and to a certain extent Kim and Roubini (2000), which by 
using a structural model find that UIP holds conditionally, despite evidence of delayed overshooting. 
21 These responses (can be obtained by the author on request) might be motivated both by the central banks 
concern about reducing the impact of the shock on aggregate demand by conducting a policy that will offset the 
exchange rate effects, but also by reducing the exchange rate shock’s impact on exchange rate themselves – 
thereby diminishing the source of the problem.  
  17more details on the importance of the exchange rate as an indicator for interest rate setting. 
The table summarize the variance decomposition for the first quarter where the maximum 
impact occurs, with the exception of Canada and the UK where the maximum impact is in the 
second quarter.  
  
Table 1. Forecast error decomposition: Contribution of monetary policy- and exchange rate 
shocks to exchange rate and interest rate variation. Maximal impact, percentage. 
￿ AUS CAN NZL SWE  UK
Monetary policy shocks;  












Exchange rate shocks;  













Of the five countries, Canada displays by far the highest degree of interaction between 
interest rate settings and exchange rate dynamics, as monetary policy shocks explain 
approximately 40 percent of the exchange rate variation, with an equal amount of interest rare 
variation explained by exchange rate shocks. New Zealand and Sweden also display some 
degree of interaction, with monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks accounting for 
10-15 percent of the exchange rate and interest rate variation respectively. For the remaining 
two countries, and in particular the UK, interaction is more modest, with exchange rate 
shocks accounting for three percent of the interest rate variation and monetary policy shocks 
accounting for seven percent of the exchange rate variation. 
Hence, monetary policy shocks explain a significant share of the exchange rate 
variation for the majority of countries, and exchange rate shocks are important indicators for 
the interest rate setting. However, the response by the central banks to the exchange rate is no 
direct evidence of the stabilization of exchange rate independent of the less controversial 
objectives such as inflation and output. More likely, it is the result of the monetary 
policymaker reacting to exchange rates due to the monetary policy lag in influencing the 
objectives such as output and inflation, as was evident from figures 2-6.  
The reported results seem to fall in between the boundaries of what has previously 
been reported. Furthermore, the finding that monetary policy shocks explain relatively more 
of the exchange rate variation in Canada than in the other countries seems to be a feature that 
is picked up in other studies. For instance, Kim and Roubini (2000) find monetary policy 
shocks to explain almost 60 percent of the exchange rate variation in Canada. However, 
whereas the effect found here is almost immediate, in Kim and Roubini the effect is 
accumulated for close to a year, as they find a pronounced delayed overshooting puzzle in the 
exchange rate. 
With regard to the remaining variables in the model, monetary policy shocks explain 
approximately 5-15 percent of output and inflation variation after 1-3 years. These results are 
in line with what has previously been reported in the literature, although the exact magnitude 




4  Robustness of results 
The robustness of the results reported above deserves further discussion on at least three 
issues with regard to specification: (i) Additional lags in the VAR, (ii) sample stability and 
(iii) choice of variables in the VAR. Below the results are presented with regard to the effect 
on the real exchange rate only, although where relevant, results for the other variables will be 
discussed. Impulse responses for all variables can be obtained from the author on request. 
 
4.1 Specification - lags 
When testing for lag reduction in the structural model, most models could be reduced to three 
lags, although reducing the VAR further to two lags could not be supported. However, in 
many of the cases test diagnostics were quite similar using either three or four lags, and to 
check the robustness of the results with regard to lag selections, all models were therefore re-
estimated using now four lags. The results of a contractionary monetary policy shock (that 
increase the interest rate with 1 pp on impact) on the exchange rate are presented in Frame A 
in Figure 8 below. In each diagram, the baseline results using three lags (solid line) is plotted 
together with the alternative of four lags (dotted lines). Overall, the main results still prevail, 
although the exact magnitude of the effects of shocks has changed somewhat. In particular, 
for Sweden the impact effect is larger initially than in the baseline, but then declines in line 
with the baseline back to equilibrium. However, there is still no evidence of an exchange rate 
puzzle in any countries, as the exchange rate appreciates on impact, and thereafter (within a 
quarter) depreciates gradually and smoothly back to equilibrium. 
 
4.2 Sample stability  
To check for robustness with respect to sample stability, all models were re-estimated shifting 
the start date first back and then forwards with five years; 1978-2004 and 1988-2004. 
Although convenient dates due to the five year interval, the dates are not chosen randomly. 
The start date for the extended sample (1978) is chosen as this is the earliest start date 
common to all countries.
23 The start date for the more recent sample (1988) is chosen for two 
reasons. First, from 1988, price stability has been a more explicit focus in many countries; 
starting with Canada and New Zealand first referring to the desirability of inflation targeting 
in 1988 and with the others countries subsequently following (see Collins and Siklos, 2004, 
and the references stated therein).
24 Second and probably related to the first, Bagliano and 
Favero (1998) have found that with regard to mis-specification, starting the estimation in 
                                                 
22 These variance decompositions can be obtained from the author on request. 
23 For Canada, data were available back to 1973, and the results are robust also to this extended period. Note that 
for New Zealand I use annual changes in CPI for the period 1978-2004, as quarterly changes showed a large 
degree of volatility in the period when New Zealand changed from a closed and centrally controlled economy to 
one of the most open economies. For Sweden, the three month interest rate was only available to 1982. I therefore 
used the Call Money Rate prior to 1982, and included a dummy to link the two interest rate series.  
24 For instance, in Australia, the aim at stabilising inflation had been included in the Bank's public statements for a 
number of years before formally adopted in 1993.  
  191988 is preferred to that of 1983 when analysing monetary policy, although the impulse 
responses using the two different periods may not be statistically different. 
The results are presented in Frame B in Figure 8. The solid line corresponds to the 
baseline scenario; the dotted line to the period starting in 1978; the semi dotted line to the 
period starting in 1988. Overall, the main conclusions prevail. In particular, there is no 
evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in any countries, as following a monetary policy shock 
the exchange rates appreciate on impact. However, in some countries, the maximal response 
is delayed a quarter using the sample starting in 1978, which is not surprising as monetary 
policy shocks are now identified on a large sample that could potentially be confounding 
different monetary policy regimes. However, the adjustment following eventually is small 
compared to the initial adjustment. 
The results using the more recent sample are also generally very supportive of the 
above findings; no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle as the exchange rates appreciate on 
impact. For some countries the effect is more pronounced, in particular for the UK where the 
maximum impact effect now comes the first quarter, indicating the importance of monetary 
policy shocks for exchange rate variation in more recent time.  
 
4.3 Specification: Additional variables  
VAR models have been criticised for not being robust to including additional variables (see 
Leeper et al., 1996, among others). A natural extension to the above model is therefore to 
include additional variables to test the robustness of results. In this regard, I examine 
inclusion of the oil price. The oil price is a natural choice as two of the countries in the sample 
are oil exporting countries (Canada and the UK), where the oil price may potentially explain a 
substantial part of the exchange rate variation.  
The results are presented in Frame C in Figure 8. The baseline 5-variable VAR is 
compared to a 6-variable VAR including oil price, where the oil price is placed first in the 
ordering. This implies that oil price shocks can affect all variables contemporaneously, while 
no other shock can affect the oil price contemporaneously. This is a plausible small country 
assumption. The model is estimated over the recent sample; 1988-2004, to avoid being 
dominated by the massive fall in oil prices in 1986 (and the subsequent adjustment in 1987). 
For comparison, the baseline VAR reported in frame C is also for the sample 1988-2004. The 
results are again supportive of the main findings; with the exception of Sweden where the 
overshooting is now delayed a few months.  
Robustness of results with respect to the use of different measures of the variables in 
the VAR, have also been examined. In particular, robustness is tested with respect to using 
annual changes in prices (versus quarterly) and using bi-variate real exchange rates instead of 
trade weighted real exchange rates. The results are robust to these amendments. However, the 
price puzzle reported in figure 2-6 above becomes less pronounced using annual inflation 
rates in the VAR, and for Sweden there is no longer any price puzzle, as was also found in 
Lindé (2003), using an equivalent inflation measure. 
  20Figure 8.  Response in the exchange rate to a monetary policy shock, structural model  
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5  Concluding remarks 
Dornbusch’s (1976) well known exchange rate overshooting is a central building block in 
international macroeconomics, stating that the nominal exchange rate immediately appreciates 
with the increase in nominal interest rates, in line with uncovered interest parity (UIP). When 
confronted with data, however, very few empirical studies analysing the effects of monetary 
policy shocks have found support for Dornbusch overshooting. Instead they have found that 
following a contractionary monetary policy shock, the real exchange rate either depreciates, 
or, if it appreciates, it does so for a prolonged period of up to three years, thereby giving a 
hump-shaped response that violates UIP. These results have been so persuasive that the 
puzzles themselves are now about to be considered consensus, of which many recently 
developed DSGE models seek to replicate.   
The majority of studies quantifying the effects of monetary policy shocks have used 
the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. A major problem facing these studies is how to 
address the simultaneity of monetary policy and the exchange rate. Most of the studies of 
open economies are placing zero contemporaneous restrictions on the response of the 
systematic interest rate setting to an exchange rate shock, or vice versa. However, this is not 
consistent with established theory neither on monetary policy nor on exchange rate 
determination. Furthermore, Faust and Rogers (2003) have recently shown that the delayed 
overshooting feature of the open economy VAR is very sensitive to this kind of restriction. 
VAR models of the open economy should therefore seek to identify monetary policy without 
restricting the contemporaneous response.  
This paper suggests an alternative identification that restricts the long run multipliers 
of the shocks, but leaves the contemporaneous relationship between the interest rate and the 
exchange rate unaltered. Identification is achieved by assuming that monetary policy shocks 
can have no long run effect on the level of the real exchange rate. This is a standard neutrality 
assumption that holds for a large class of models in the monetary policy literature. In the short 
run, however, monetary policy is free to influence the exchange rate. 
Allowing for full simultaneity between monetary policy and the exchange rate, I find 
striking results; Contrary to the recent “consensus”, a contractionary monetary policy shock 
has a strong effect on the exchange rate that appreciates on impact. The maximal impact 
occurs immediately, and the exchange rate thereafter gradually depreciates back to baseline. 
This is consistent with the Dornbusch overshooting hypothesis. Furthermore, the ensuing 
movement of the exchange rate is with few exceptions consistent with UIP. Hence, I have 
found no evidence of the typical hump-shaped response found in the empirical literature, 
where the maximal impact occurs after 2-3 years; (i.e. Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995).  
Furthermore, the qualitative properties of a monetary policy with regard to domestic 
variables that have been found in the established literature still hold. In particular, a 
contractionary policy shock temporarily lowers output and has a sluggish but eventually 
negative effect on consumer price inflation.  
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  26Appendix A 
 
All data are taken from the OECD database, except the Fed Funds rate that is taken from Eco 
Win. GDP and inflation are seasonally adjusted (s.a) by the official sources, the remaining 
series are unadjusted. The following data series are used: 
 
(πt) Inflation, measured as quarterly changes in the consumer price index (CPI) except for UK 
where the harmonized CPI is used (the only series available s.a.) 
 
(yt) Log real GDP, deflated by the official sources 
 
(et) [CCRETT01.IXOB.Q] Log of the real effective exchange rate, measured against a basket 
of trading partners. The exchange rate is specified so that an increase implies depreciation. 
 
(it) [IR3TBB01.ST.Q] Three month domestic interest rate.  
 
(it*) Trade-weighted foreign interest rate. For Canada and the UK, the foreign interest rate is 
represented by the Federal Funds rate, as the US comprises more than 50 percent of the 
foreign trade weight.
25 For Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, the foreign interest is an 
weighted average of the interest rate in the major trading partners, source: Reserve Bank of 
Australia (http://www.rba.gov.au/), Reserve Bank of New Zealand (http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/) 





                                                 
25 For Canada, more than 80 percent of its export goes to the US. 
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